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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
STATE
FARM
REMEDIES.

EXHAUSTED

ITS

ADMINISTRATIVE

Appellees argue that State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company

("State Farm") failed

to exhaust

all

administrative

remedies available to it and is thereby precluded from seeking
trials de novo in the district court.

However, State Farm did

exhaust all mandatory administrative remedies prior to filing its
petitions for review of the final agency actions in the Third
Judicial

District

argument

is

Court.

their

failure

The fatal
to

flaw

interpret

in the appellees'
and

harmonize

the

provisions of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, § 34-35-1 et
seq., the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-l et seq., and the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division
Administrative Rules, R. 560-1 et seq.

The appellees merely

focus on a single section or subpart of a particular statute and
fail to interpret and harmonize that section or subpart with the
entire statutory scheme embodied in the Utah Anti-Discrimination
Act, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, and the Utah AntiDiscrimination Division Administrative Rules.
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 sets forth the procedure applicable to a discrimination claim brought under state law.
statute sets forth two distinct procedures.
forth

in Utah

defined

as

The procedures set

Code Ann. § 34-35-7 .1 (1)-(5) are

informal

adjudicative

1

This

proceedings.

specifically
Utah

Anti-

Discrimination

Division

Administrative

Rule,

R.

560-l-3(f).

After the informal proceedings are concluded, this statute provides that a party may request an evidentiary hearing to review
de novo the director's determination and order.

It is the posi-

tion of the appellees that failure to request this evidentiary
hearing equates to a failure to exhaust available administrative
remedies.
language

This interpretation is not supported by the express
of

the

statute.

Utah

Code Ann.

§ 34-35-7.1 (5) (c)

specifically provides as follows:
A party may file a written request to the
director for an evidentiary hearing to review
de novo the director's determination and orderwithin 30 days of the date of the determination and order. [Emphasis added]
The permissive language contained in this subpart indicates that
a party is not required to request an evidentiary hearing, and
can allow the order to become a final order and then seek a trial
de novo in the district court.
The Anti-Discrimination Act sets forth a statutory scheme
which permits an adversely affected party to take two courses of
action in respect to seeking further review of the determination
and order resulting from the informal adjudicative proceedings.
An adversely affected party can request an evidentiary hearing
and

convert

the informal process

into a formal

adjudicative

hearing or the adversely affected party can allow the determination and order to become a final order and seek a trial de novo
in the district court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63~46b-15.

2

Reduced to its basics, State Farm's position is that there is
a "fork" in the road which permits the adversely affected party
to pursue either of the two courses of action set forth above.
It is the position of the appellees that no such fork exists and
that an adversely affected party is limited to requesting an
evidentiary hearing and converting the informal process into a
formal

adjudicative

hearing.

Appellees' argument

fails

to

harmonize the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act,

the

Utah

Anti-discrimination

Act,

and

the

Utah

Anti-

discrimination Division Rules.
It cannot be disputed that the provisions set forth at Utah
Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(1)-(5) sets forth an informal adjudicative
process.

Utah Anti-Discrimination Division Administrative Rule,

R 560-l-3(f). The Utah Administrative Procedures Act specifically

states

that

final

agency

action

resulting

from

informal

adjudicative proceedings can be appealed to the district court
for a trial de novo. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-15 (1) (a) provides
in pertinent part as follows:
The district courts have jurisdiction to
review by trial de novo all final agency
actions resulting from informal adjudicative
proceedings . . .
Thus, because this is a final agency action resulting from an
informal adjudication proceeding, State Farm is entitled to seek
a trial de novo in the district court.

If one accepts appellees'

position, one must ignore the clear language of Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-15.

3

Appellees rely heavily on High Country Homeowners Ass'n v.
Public Service Comm'n of Utah, 779 P.2d 682 (Utah 1989).

In that

case, the High Country Homeowners Association sought review by
the Utah Supreme Court of an order issued by the Public Service
Commission.

The Division of Public Utilities intervened, and

moved for summary disposition on jurisdictional grounds claiming
that the Homeowners Association had failed to comply with the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 57-7-15. That statute provides in
pertinent part:
Review
or
Rehearing
by
Application — Procedure —
Court Action.

Commission
—
Prerequisite to

(1)

Before seeking judicial review of the
Commissioner's
action,
any
party,
stockholder, bond holder, or other person
pecuniarily interested in the public
utility who is dissatisfied with an order
of
the
commission
shall
meet
the
requirements of this section.

(2)

(a)

After any order or decision has been
made by the commission, any party to
the action or proceeding, or any
stockholder or bond holder or otherparty pecuniarily interested in the
public utility affected may apply
for re-hearing of any matters determined in the action or proceeding.

(b)

No applicant may urge or rely on any
ground not set forth in the application in an appeal to any court.,
[Emphasis added]

Clearly, the statute at issue in the High Country case is
distinguishable from Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1. Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-7-15 specifically requires by the use of the word "shall"
that parties dissatisfied with an order of the commission shall
4

meet the requirements of this section.

This statute indicates

that an adversely affected party may apply for re-hearing of any
matters determined in the action or proceeding.

It is apparently

appellees' position that the subsequent use of the word "may" is
comparable to the language contained in Utah Code Ann. § 34-357.1.

However, this interpretation is flawed in that Utah Code

Ann. § 57-7-15(1) expressly states that a party "shall" meet the
requirements of this section before obtaining judicial review.
This type of mandatory language is not present in Utah Code Ann.
§ 34-35-7.1.
The only Utah case which interprets a statute containing a
similar use of the permissive "may" language as opposed to the
mandatory "shall" language in respect to seeking further agency
review is Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah
App.

1991).

plaintiff

did

In Heinecke, the Court of Appeals held that the
not

need

to

seek

review

of

the

determination prior to obtaining judicial review.

division's
In reaching

that result, the Court of Appeals held as follows:
[N]o provision in the statutes governing the
division appears to provide for a review
beyond the divisional level as contemplated in
§ 12(1)(a) of UAPA, which review would in any
case be optional so as not to defeat finality
for the purposes of judicial review given the
"permanent" and "may" usages of the section,
nor is any mandatory review provided for as
contemplated in Section 12(3).
Heinecke, 810 P.2d at 463.

Appellees are apparently taking the

position that Heinecke was wrongly decided because the issue
concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies was not properly
5

briefed.1

However, the Heinecke decision indicates that counsel

for the division

specifically

brought

to the Utah

Court of

Appeals' attention the case of High Country Homeowners v. Public
Service Comm'n, 779 P.2d 682 (Utah 1989).
case relied upon by appellees.

This is the primary

The Utah Court of Appeals noted

that the High Country court found that Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15
imposed a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review of the
PSC's action, and held that "failing to apply for re-hearing
within 20 days of the commission's issuance of the order divests
[the Supreme Court] of subject matter jurisdiction."

Heinecke,

810 P.2d at 462-63; citing High Country Homeowners, 779 P.2d at
684.

The Heinecke court noted that the case presently before

them

was,

as

is

the

instant

case,

subject

to

no

such

jurisdictional prerequisite.
In the instant case, Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7 .1 (5) (c)-(d)
states:
(c)

A party may file a written request to the
director for an evidentiary hearing to
review de novo the director's determination and order within 30 days of the date
of the determination and order.

(d)

If the director receives no timely
request for a hearing, the determination
and
order
issued
by
the
director
requiring the respondent to cease any
discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice and to provide relief to the

Although the specific issue was not briefed by the parties,
the Utah Court of Appeals indicated that it conducted its own
independent research concerning this issue. Heinecke, 810 P.2d at
463.
6

aggrieved party becomes the final order
of the commission. [Emphasis added]
This code section contains the permissive language referred
to in the Heinecke case.

As the Heinecke court pointed out,

where such permissive language is used, the decision by a party
not to pursue the "optional" further administrative review does
not bar that party

from

seeking

judicial review based on a

purported failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act sets forth a unique procedural method for resolving state law anti-discrimination claims.
The act specifically sets forth an informal adjudicative process
that can result in final agency action if a formal evidentiary is
not requested.

Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(1)-(5).

These proce-

dures have been specifically defined as an informal adjudicative
proceeding.

Rule

560-l-3(f).

Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 63-46b-15

specifically provides that district courts have jurisdiction to
review by trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from
informal adjudicative proceedings.

Clearly, if the legislature

had intended that the proceedings set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 34-35-7 . 1 (1)-(5) were some type of process that did not qualify
as an informal adjudicative proceeding, then it would have been
defined

as

such.

However, the express

designation

of

this

section of the statute as an informal adjudicative proceeding
renders

the

review

mandated

by

applicable.

7

Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 63-46b-15

Appellees also claim that State Farm confuses "final agency
action" with agency action that subsequently becomes a "final
order."

However, the appellees admit that the determination and

order became a "final agency action" when the time for requesting
the further optional administrative review had lapsed.
Appellee, Brenda Mena, p. 16.

Brief of

Clearly, because the further

optional appellate review was not requested, the action taken by
the agency constituted final agency action. Appellant's argument
to the contrary is purely a matter of semantics.

It is incongru-

ous to argue that because an additional optional administrative
remedy could have been pursued, that there can never be a "final
agency action" that would allow State Farm to seek

judicial

review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15.
A.

State Farm's Interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1
Would Not Cause Possible Inconsistent Results.
Appellees take the position that under State Farm's interpre-

tation of the applicable statutes, contrary and
results could be attained.
both parties were

inconsistent

It is appellees' position that if

"aggrieved" by the determination and order

issued as a result of the informal adjudicative proceedings, that
one party could seek an administrative evidentiary hearing on
damages and the other party could request a trial de novo in the
district court, seeking to have the informal adjudicative order
overturned.

However, this scenario could not occur based upon

the applicable statutory language.

8

If one party

requests

an evidentiary

hearing to

review

de novo the director's determination and order pursuant to Utah
Code § 34-35-7.1(5)(c), then final agency action would not have
occurred which would prohibit a request for a trial de novo in
the district court.

Final agency action does not exist until 30

days after the determination and order is issued.

If any party

requests an evidentiary hearing within 30 days after the informal
adjudicative procedure has resulted in a determination and order,
then the matter would be converted to a formal adjudication.
POINT II.
STATE FARM'S APPEALS WERE TIMELY FILED WITH
THE DISTRICT COURTS.
Appellees argue that State Farm's petitions were not timely
filed and that State Farm should have filed the petitions within
30 days of the date of issuance.
fails

to

take

into

However, appellees' argument

consideration

the

specific

and

unique

statutory language contained in Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1.

As

stated in State Farm's initial brief, Utah Code Ann. § 34-357.1(5)(c)-(d) clearly states that an informal adjudicative order
becomes final 30 days after it is issued if no timely request for
an evidentiary hearing is made. Therefore, because the order was
not final until 30 days after issuance, State Farm could not
appeal to the district courts until that time period had expired.
Appellees rely on Dusty's, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992).
reliance is misplaced.

However, this

In Dusty's, the Utah Supreme Court held

9

that the relevant time period is 30 days from the issuance of the
order constituting final agency action.

However, the "findings

of facts, conclusions of law, and final decision" of the Tax
Commission in that case provided a specific notice which stated:
NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the
date of this order to file in the Supreme
Court a petition for judicial review.
Utah
Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-13(1), 53-46b-14(2)(a).
It is clear that in Dusty'sf the "final decision" was a final
order on the date of its issuance.
statutory

However, due to the unique

language of the Utah Anti-Discrimination

Act, the

informal adjudicative procedure did not result in a final order
until 30 days after the issuance of the order.

It would have

been impossible for State Farm to file its petition with the
district court within 30 days of the issuance of the order.
CONCLUSION
The district courts erred in their interpretation of Utah
Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 by failing to construe the statute so as to
give effect to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-l et seq.
Utah

The statutory scheme embodied in the

Anti-Discrimination

Procedures

Act

sets

forth

Act

and

two

the

options

Utah
for

Administrative
a party

who

adversely affected by an informal adjudicative decision.

is
The

first option is to seek an agency evidentiary hearing and convert
the informal adjudication to a formal adjudication.

The second

option is to allow the informal adjudication to became a final
order and then request a trial de novo in the district court.

10

The district courts erred in concluding that the second option
did not exist.
Administrative
provisions

of

harmonize

the

The district courts' conclusion ignores the
Procedures
the

Utah

provisions

Act

and

focuses

Anti-Discrimination
of

those

solely
Act,

statutory

on

failing

schemes.

the
to
The

judgments of dismissal should be reversed.
DATED this

^

r r t ^ ^ ^ X ^

day of

-
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